J Adam Carter

Recent and forthcoming publications

Books

  1. A Telic Theory of Trust
    Forthcoming 2024. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OUP page
  2. Stratified Virtue Epistemology: A Defence
    2023. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CUP page
  3. Digital Knowledge
    2023. London: Routledge. Routledge page
  4. Automomous Knowledge
    2022. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OUP page Reviewed here (by L. Olin) and here (by C. Tweedt).
  5. This is Epistemology (w/ C. Littlejohn).
    2021. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. Wiley-Blackwell page
  6. The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology (w/ F. Broncano-Berrocal).
    2021. London: Routledge. Routledge page
  7. A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How (w/ T. Poston).
    2018. London: Continuum. Bloomsbury page
  8. Metaepistemology and Relativism
    2016. Palgrave MacMillan. PDF | Amazon

Edited Books

  1. Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement (w/ M. Baghramian and R. Cosker-Rowland)
    Forthcoming 2024. Routledge.
  2. The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (w/ F. Broncano-Berrocal)
    2021. Routledge. ISBN 9780367077426
  3. Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation (w/ P. Bondy)
    2019. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755
  4. Socially Extended Epistemology (w/ A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, & D. Pritchard)
    2018. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198801764
  5. Extended Epistemology (w/ A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, & D. Pritchard)
    2018. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198769811
  6. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind (w/ E.C. Gordon & B.W. Jarvis)
    2017. Oxford: Oxford University Press: ISBN 9780198716310
  7. The Moral Psychology of Pride (w/ E.C. Gordon)
    2017. London: Rowman and Littlefield. ISBN 9781783489084

Journal Articles

  1. Easy Practical Knowledge (w/ T. Kearl)
    Forthcoming. Journal of Philosophy. (PDF)
  2. What the tortoise should do: a knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation (with L. M. Titus)
    Forthcoming. Noûs. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12460)
  3. Safety and Dream Scepticism in Sosa's Epistemology (w/ R. Cowan)
    Forthcoming. Synthese. (PDF)
  4. Frege on the Tolerability of Sense Variation: A Reply to Michaelson and Textor (w/ B. Pickel)
    Forthcoming. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (PDF)
  5. Trust and trustworthiness
    2023. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 107(2): 377-394. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12918)
  6. Knowledge, practical knowledge, and intentional action (with J. Shepherd)
    2023. Ergo. 9: 556-583. (doi: 10.3998/ergo.2277)
  7. Intentional action and knowledge-centred theories of control (with J. Shepherd)
    2023. Philosophical Studies. 180(3): 957-977. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01904-4)
  8. Simion and Kelp on trustworthy AI
    2023. Asian Journal of Philosophy. 2(1): 18. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00067-1)
  9. Trust, distrust, and testimonial injustice (with D. Meehan)
    2023. Educational Philosophy and Theory. 55(3): 290-300. (doi: 10.1080/00131857.2022.2037418)
  10. How to be an infallibilist (with C. Kelp and M. Simion)
    2022. Philosophical Studies. 179(8): 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)
  11. On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology
    2022. Asian Journal of Philosophy. 1(2): 44. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-022-00045-z)
  12. Trust as performance
    2022. Philosophical Issues. 32(1): 120-147. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12214)
  13. Therapeutic trust
    2022. Philosophical Psychology. (Early Online Publication) (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2058925)
  14. Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory (with L. Miracchi)
    2022. Synthese. 200: 1-28. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03462-y)
  15. De Minimis Normativism: A New Theory of Full Aptness
    2021. Philosophical Quarterly 71(1): 16-36.
    PDF | doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa017
    ↪ Winner of the Philosophical Quarterly Essay Prize 2019.
  16. Technologically scaffolded atypical cognition: the case of YouTube’s recommender system (with M. Alfano, A. E. Fard, P. Clutton, and C. Klein)
    2021. Synthese. 199(1-2): 835-858. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02724-x)
  17. Understanding a communicated thought (with E. Gordon and J.P. Grodniewicz)
    2021. Synthese. 198(12): 12137-12151. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02854-2)
  18. Archimedean metanorms
    2021. Topoi. 40(5): 1075-1085. (doi: 10.1007/s11245-018-9586-9)
  19. Absolutism, relativism and metaepistemology (with R. McKenna)
    2021. Erkenntnis. 86(5): 1139-1159. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-019-00147-w)
  20. Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale (with R. D. Rupert)
    2021. Synthese. 198(10): 9243-9272. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02631-1)
  21. Introduction to Special Issue: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst (with G. Dechauffour and G. Lefftz)
    2021. Synthese. 198(15): 3517-3519. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03241-1)
  22. Educating for intellectual virtue: a critique from action guidance (with B. Kotzee and H. Siegel)
    2021. Episteme. 18(2): 177-199. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2019.10)
  23. Exercising abilities
    2021. Synthese. 198(3): 2495-2509. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02227-4)
  24. Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing
    2020. Synthese. 197(12): 5117-5136. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1181-2)
  25. Varieties of cognitive integration (with J. Kallestrup)
    2020. Noûs. 54(4): 867-890. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12288)
  26. On behalf of a bi-level account of trust
    2020. Philosophical Studies. 177: 2299-2322. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01311-2)
  27. Skepticism motivated: on the skeptical import of motivated reasoning (with R. McKenna)
    2020. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 50(6): 702-718. (doi: 10.1017/can.2020.16)
  28. The philosophy of memory technologies: metaphysics, knowledge, and values (with R. Heersmink)
    2020. Memory Studies. 13(4): 416-433. (doi: 10.1177/1750698017703810)
  29. Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement
    2020. Synthese. 197(7): 2937-2961. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1549-y)
  30. Introduction to Special Issue: Knowledge, Virtue and Action (w/ C. Mi, O. Palermos & D. Pritchard)
    2020. Synthese. 197(6): 2291-2294. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02662-8)
  31. Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education
    2020. Journal of Philosophy of Education. 54(2): 449-466. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9752.12420)
  32. Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem
    2020. Philosophical Studies. 177(5): 1229-1254. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01243-x)
  33. Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge (with R. McKenna)
    2019. Synthese. 196(12): 4989-5007. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8)
  34. Knowledge-how, understanding-why, and epistemic luck: an experimental study (with D. Pritchard and J. Shepherd)
    2019. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 10(4): 701-734. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9)
  35. Vices of distrust (with D. Meehan)
    2019. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. 8(10): 25-32.
  36. Radical scepticism and the epistemology of confusion
    2019. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 9(3): 223-237. 10.1163/22105700-20191387)
  37. Autonomy, cognitive offloading and education
    2019. Educational Theory. 68(6): 657-673. 10.1111/edth.12338)
  38. The epistemology of cognitive enhancement (with D. Pritchard)
    2019. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 44(2): 220-242. 10.1093/jmp/jhy040
  39. Technological Seduction and Self-Radicalization
    Forthcoming in Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    PDF | DOI:
  40. ↪ Reprinted in The Philosophers' Annual.
  41. On behalf of controversial view agnosticism
    2018. European Journal of Philosophy. 26(4): 1358-1370. (doi: 10.1111/ejop.12333)
  42. Meta-epistemic defeat
    2018. Synthese. 195(7): 2877-2896. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1187-9)
  43. Welcome to the machine (with N. McDonnell)
    2018. Philosophers' Magazine. 81: 33-39. (doi: 10.5840/tpm20188144)
  44. Virtue epistemology, enhancement, and control
    2018. Metaphilosophy. 49(3): 283-304. (doi: 10.1111/meta.12304)
  45. The basing relation and the impossibility of the debasing demon (with P. Bondy)
    2018. American Philosophical Quarterly. 55(3): 203.
  46. Virtuous insightfulness
    2017. Episteme. 14(4): 539-554. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2016.37)
  47. (Anti)-anti-intellectualism and the sufficiency thesis (with B. Czarnecki)
    2017. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 98(S1): 374-397. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12187)
  48. The defeasibility of knowledge-how (with J. Navarro)
    2017. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 95(3): 662-685. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12441)
  49. Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism (with A. Carter and J. H. Collin)
    2017. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 16(3): 387-402. (doi: 10.1007/s11097-016-9458-y)
  50. The modal account of luck revisited (with M. Peterson)
    2017. Synthese. 194(6): 2175-2184. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1047-7)
  51. Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy
    2017. Synthese. 194(5): 1463-1476. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5)
  52. Googled assertion (with E. C. Gordon)
    2017. Philosophical Psychology. 30(4): 490-501. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395)
  53. On epistemic consequentialism and the virtue conflation problem (with I. M. Church)
    2016. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 5(4): 239-248. (doi: 10.1002/tht3.218)
  54. Not knowing a cat is a cat: analyticity and knowledge ascriptions (with M. Peterson and B. van Bezooijen)
    2016. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 7(4): 817-834. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-015-0279-7)
  55. Belief without credence (with B. W. Jarvis and K. Rubin)
    2016. Synthese. 193(8): 2323-2351. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6)
  56. Extended cognition and propositional memory (with J. Kallestrup)
    2016. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 92(3): 691-714. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12157)
  57. Extended knowledge-how (with B. Czarnecki)
    2016. Erkenntnis. 81(2): 259-273. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9738-x)
  58. On the epistemology of the precautionary principle: reply to Steglich-Petersen (with M. Peterson)
    2016. Erkenntnis. 81(2): 297-304. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3)
  59. Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives
    2016. Philosophical Studies. 173(4): 969-990. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-015-0533-y)
  60. Group peer disagreement
    2016. Ratio. 29(1): 11-28. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12077)
  61. Robust virtue epistemology as anti-luck epistemology: a new solution
    2016. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 97(1): 140-155. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12040)
  62. Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition (with S. O. Palermos)
    2016. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 2(4): 542-560. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2016.28)
  63. Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility (with E. C. Gordon)
    2016. Logos and Episteme. 7(4): 489-502. (doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme20167444)
  64. Extended emotion (with E. C. Gordon and S. O. Palermos)
    2016. Philosophical Psychology. 29(2): 198-217. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1063596)
  65. Richard Rorty and epistemic normativity (with E. T. Kerr)
    2016. Social Epistemology. 30(1): 3-24. (doi: 10.1080/02691728.2014.971914)
  66. Knowledge-how and epistemic value (with D. Pritchard)
    2015. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 93(4): 799-816. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.997767)
  67. Knowledge-how and epistemic luck (with D. Pritchard)
    2015. Noûs. 49(3): 440-453. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12054)
  68. Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement (with D. Pritchard)
    2015. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 91(1): 181-199. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12094)
  69. Varieties of cognitive achievement (with B. W. Jarvis and K. Rubin)
    2015. Philosophical Studies. 172(6): 1603-1623. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0367-z)
  70. On cognitive and moral enhancement: a reply to Savulescu and Persson (with E. C. Gordon)
    2015. Bioethics. 29(3): 153-161. (doi: 10.1111/bioe.12076)
  71. On the epistemology of the precautionary principle (with M. Peterson)
    2015. Erkenntnis. 80(1): 1-13. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x)
  72. Group knowledge and epistemic defeat
    2015. Ergo. 2(28): 711-735. (doi: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.028)
  73. Varieties of externalism (with J. Kallestrup, S. O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard)
    2014. Philosophical Issues. 24(1): 63-109. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12026)
  74. Openmindedness and truth (with E. C. Gordon)
    2014. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 44(2): 207-224. (doi: 10.1080/00455091.2014.923247)
  75. On testimony and transmission (with P. J. Nickel)
    2014. Episteme. 11(2): 145-155. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2014.4)
  76. A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist (with E. C. Gordon)
    2014. Synthese. 191(8): 1683-1695. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0357-2)
  77. Disagreement, relativism and doxastic revision
    2014. Erkenntnis. 79(S1): 155-172. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9450-7)
  78. Relativism, knowledge and understanding
    2014. Episteme. 11(1): 35-52. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2013.45)
  79. Objectual understanding and the value problem
    2014. American Philosophical Quarterly. 51(1): 1-13.
  80. Extended cognition and epistemic luck
    2013. Synthese. 190(18): 4201-4214. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0267-3)
  81. Intelligence, wellbeing and procreative beneficence (with E. C. Gordon)
    2013. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 30(2): 122-135. (doi: 10.1111/japp.12011)
  82. A problem for Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology
    2013. Erkenntnis. 78(2): 253-275. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9315-x)
  83. Varieties of cognitive achievement (with B. Jarvis and K. Rubin)
    2013. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 91(2): 249-263. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.694455)
  84. Against swamping (with B. Jarvis)
    2012. Analysis. 72(4): 690-699. (doi: 10.1093/analys/ans118)
  85. Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry? (with M. Chrisman)
    2012. Philosophical Studies. 159(3): 323-339. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-011-9710-9)
  86. On Stanley’s intellectualism
    2012. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 20(5): 749-762. (doi: 10.1080/09672559.2012.741820)
  87. Recent work on Moore’s proof
    2012. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 2(2): 115-144. (doi: 10.1163/221057011X560974)
  88. Norms of assertion: the quantity and quality of epistemic support
    2011. Philosophia. 39(4): 615-635. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-011-9317-6)
  89. Kvanvig on pointless truths and the cognitive ideal
    2011. Acta Analytica. 26(3): 285-293. (doi: 10.1007/s12136-010-0114-9)
  90. Radical skepticism, closure, and robust knowledge
    2011. Journal of Philosophical Research. 36: 115-133. (doi: 10.5840/jpr_2011_2)
  91. Anti-luck epistemology and safety’s (recent) discontents
    2010. Philosophia. 38(3): 517-532. (doi: 10.1007/s11406-009-9219-z)
  92. Just the right thickness: a defense of second-wave virtue epistemology (with G. Axtell)
    2008. Philosophical Papers. 37(3): 413-434. (doi: 10.1080/05568640809485229)

Book Chapters

  1. Knowledge Norms and Conversation
    Forthcoming. Epistemology of Conversation, (ed.) Waldomiro J. Silva Filho (Dordrecht, Springer). PDF
  2. Analysis of Knowledge
    Forthcoming. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, (ed.) K. Sylvan. PDF
  3. Understanding, vulnerability and risk
    2023. In: González-Castán, Ó.L. (ed.) Cognitive Vulnerability: An Epistemological Approach. Berlin studies in knowledge research, 18. De Gruyter: Berlin, pp. 177-192. ISBN 9783110799163 (doi: 10.1515/9783110799163-011)
  4. Intuitions (with J. J. Ichikawa)
    2023. In: Oxford Bibliographies Online. Oxford University Press. (In Press)
  5. Reply to critics: collective (telic) virtue epistemology
    2022. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 363-366. ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-48)
  6. Reply to Gardiner on virtues of attention
    2022. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 73-76. ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-8)
  7. Reply to Watson on the social virtue of questioning
    2022. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 442-444. ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-58)
  8. Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals
    2022. In: Sosa, E., Steup, M., Turri, J. and Roeber, B. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)
  9. On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology (with M. Simion and C. Kelp)
    2022. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge. ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)
  10. Collateral conflicts and epistemic norms
    2021. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. ISBN 9781003134565 (doi: 10.4324/9781003134565-5)
  11. Politics, deep disagreement, and relativism
    2021. In: Hannon, M. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge. ISBN 9780367345907
  12. Trust and its significance in social epistemology
    2021. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (In Press)
  13. The epistemology of group disagreement: an introduction (with F. Broncano-Berrocal)
    2020. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 1-8. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-1)
  14. Deliberation and group disagreement (with F. Broncano-Berrocal)
    2020. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 9-45. ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-2)
  15. Intellectual humility and assertion (with E. C. Gordon)
    2020. In: Alfano, M., Lynch, M. P. and Tanesini, A. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. Routledge: Oxon, UK, pp. 335-345. ISBN 9780815364115
  16. Collective (telic) virtue epistemology
    2020. In: Alfano, M., de Ridder, J. and Klein, C. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge: London. (Accepted for Publication)
  17. Is searching the internet making us intellectually arrogant? (with E. Gordon)
    2020. In: Tanesini, A. and Lynch, M. P. (eds.) Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge, pp. 88-103. ISBN 9780367260859 (doi: 10.4324/9780429291395-9)
  18. Epistemic autonomy and externalism
    2020. In: Lougheed, K. and Matheson, J. (eds.) Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge: London, UK. (Accepted for Publication)
  19. Varieties of (extended) thought manipulation
    2020. In: Blitz, M. and Bublitz, C. (eds.) The Future of Freedom of Thought: Liberty, Technology, and Neuroscience. Palgrave Macmillan. (In Press)
  20. Epistemic pluralism (with A.-K. Koch)
    2020. In: Harris, P., Bitoni, A., Fleisher, C.S. and Skorkjær Binderkrantz, A. (eds.) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan. (Accepted for Publication)
  21. Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology
    2020. In: Klenk, M. (ed.) Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge: New York. ISBN 9780367343200
  22. The superstitious lawyer's inference (with P. Bondy)
    2019. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755
  23. Well-founded belief: an introduction (with P. Bondy)
    2019. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755
  24. Relativism and externalism (with R. McKenna)
    2019. In: Kusch, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge: London. ISBN 9781138484283
  25. Epistemic luck and the extended mind
    2019. In: Church, I. M. and Hartman, R. J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of The Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Routledge: New York, pp. 318-319. ISBN 9780815366591
  26. Virtue perspectivism, externalism, and epistemic circularity
    2019. In: Crețu, A.-M. and Massimi, M. (eds.) Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Synthese library (Studies in epistemology, logic, methodology, and philosophy of science), 416. Springer: Cham, pp. 123-140. ISBN 9783030270407 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4_8)
  27. Extended self-knowledge (with D. Pritchard)
    2018. In: Pedrini, P. and Kirsch, J. (eds.) Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Contributions to phenomenology (96). Springer: Cham, pp. 31-49. ISBN 9783319986449 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_3)
  28. New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mind (with A. Clark and S. O. Palermos)
    2018. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 331-351. ISBN 9780198769811
  29. Extended circularity: a new puzzle for extended cognition (with J. Kallestrup)
    2018. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 42-63. ISBN 9780198769811
  30. Epistemic Pluralism, Epistemic Relativism and 'Hinge' Epistemology
    2017. In: Coliva, A. and Pedersen, N. J.L.L. (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave, pp. 229-252. ISBN 9783319654591
  31. Knowledge-First: An Introduction (with E. C. Gordon and B. W. Jarvis)
    2017. In: Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C., and Jarvis, B. W. (eds.) Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, pp. 1-18. ISBN 9780198716310 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198716310.003.0001)
  32. Cognitive Bias, Scepticism and Understanding (with D. Pritchard)
    2017. In: Grimm, S. R., Baumberger, C., and Ammon, S. (eds.) Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge: New York, pp. 272-292. ISBN 9781138921931
  33. The Moral Psychology of Pride: An Introduction (with E. C. Gordon)
    2017. In: Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (eds.) The Moral Psychology of Pride. Moral psychology of the emotions. Rowan & Liitlefield: London, UK, pp. 1-11. ISBN 9781783489084
  34. Are Theism and Atheism Totally Opposed? Can They Learn from Each Other?
    2017. In: Harris, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone. Routledge: New York, pp. 82-92. ISBN 9781138234215
  35. Epistemological Implications of Relativism
    2017. In: Ichikawa, J. J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Taylor and Francis, pp. 292-301. ISBN 9781138818392
  36. Epistemic Luck (with F. Broncano-Berrocal)
    2017. In: Crane, T. (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor and Francis.
  37. Inference to the Best Explanation and Epistemic Circularity (with D. Pritchard)
    2017. In: McCain, K. and Poston, T. (eds.) Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198746904
  38. Objectual Understanding, Factivity and Belief (with E. C. Gordon)
    2016. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter, pp. 423-442. ISBN 9783110496345
  39. Intellectual Humility, Knowledge-How, and Disagreement (with D. Pritchard)
    2016. In: Mi, C., Slote, M., and Sosa, E. (eds.) Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. Routledge: New York, pp. 49-63. ISBN 9781138925168
  40. Epistemology and Active Externalism (with S. O. Palermos)
    2015. In: Oxford Bibligraphies Online: Philosphy. Oxford University Press. (doi: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0285)

Book Reviews

  1. Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology (2022)
    Carter, J. A. Philosophical Review, 131(2), pp. 235-240. DOI: 10.1215/00318108-9554769 [Book Review]
  2. Review of Epistemology by Ernest Sosa (2017)
    Carter, A. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2017, [Book Review]
  3. MOOCS, by Jonathan Haber (2015)
    Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. Teaching Philosophy, 38(4), pp. 455-458. [Book Review]
  4. Review of Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (Eds) Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work (2014)
    Carter, J. A. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014, [Book Review]
  5. Faulkner, Paul, Knowledge on Trust (2013)
    Carter, J. A. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 409-413. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2013.775169 [Book Review]
  6. The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology (2013)
    Carter, J. A. Philosophical Quarterly, 63(250), pp. 184-187. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00096.x [Book Review]
  7. Review of E. Sosa's "Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge," Volumes I and II (2010)
    Carter, J. A. ProtoSociology, [Book Review]
  8. On Cappelen and Hawthorne's "Relativism and Monadic Truth" (2009)
    Carter, J. A. ProtoSociology, [Book Review]

Reference Articles

  1. Metaepistemology (with E. Sosa)
    2022. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. The Value of Knowledge (with D. Pritchard and J. Turri)
    2022. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. Relativism (with M. Baghramian)
    2021. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  4. The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust (with M. Simion)
    2020. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  5. Epistemology and Relativism
    2016. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Edited Journal Special Issues

  1. Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge (with Kelp, C. Kelp and M. Simion)
    2022. Philosophical Studies, 179(8)
  2. Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge
    Carter, J. A., Kelp, C., and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022)
    Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]
  3. Epistemology
    Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C., Lyons, J. C., and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021)
    Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]
  4. Extended Knowledge
    Carter, J. A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2014)
    Philosophical Issues. 24(1) [Edited Journal]
  5. Special Issue of Synthese: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst [Guest Editors] (2019)
    Carter, J. A., Leffetz, G., and Dechauffour, G. (Eds.) Springer. (In Press)
  6. Special Issue of Synthese: Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives [Guest Editors] (2020)
    Carter, J. A., Mi, C., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) Springer. ISBN 0039-7857
  7. Special Issue of American Philosophical Quarterly: Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle [Guest Editors] (2016)
    Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) University of Illinois Press.
  8. Special Issue of Logos and Episteme: Intellectual Humility [Guest Editors] (2016)
    Carter, J. A., Kallestrup, J., and Palermos, S. O. (Eds.) Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy.